Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
1995-2002 Court Filings

2000 Trial

5-7-1997

Motion of the State of Ohio for Judgment on the Pleadings,
Hearing Requested
Stephanie Tubbs Jones
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor

Marilyn B. Cassidy
Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecutor

Patrick J. Murphy
Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecutor

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/
sheppard_court_filings_2000

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Jones, Stephanie Tubbs; Cassidy, Marilyn B.; and Murphy, Patrick J., "Motion of the State of Ohio for
Judgment on the Pleadings, Hearing Requested" (1997). 1995-2002 Court Filings. 4.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/sheppard_court_filings_2000/4

This Davis v. State of Ohio, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Case No. CV96-312322 is brought to you for free and
open access by the 2000 Trial at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1995-2002 Court
Filings by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY
ALAN DAVIS, EXECUTOR,

CASE NO. 312322

Plaintiff
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER

v.
1) MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEAPING&

STATE OF OHIO,
Defendant

2) HEARING REQUESTED

Defendant, State of Ohio, by and through counsel, Stephanie
Tubbs

Jones,

Assistant

Prosecuting

Prosecuting

Attorney

Attorneys,

for

Marilyn

Cuyahoga
Barkley

County,

and

Cassidy

and

Patrick Murphy, hereby moves this Honorable Court for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C). The grounds for
this motion are that the State of Ohio is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law as is set forth more fully in the brief attached
hereto and expressly incorporated herein by reference.
Respectfully Submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY

L Y CASSIDY (0 14647)
HY ( 0002401)
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
~.n ...........

-

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
INTRODUCTION
Alan J. Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that
he is a wrongfully incarcerated individual pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code Sections 2305.02 and 2743.48. The State of Ohio asserts that,
pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) the court should enter judgment
as a matter of law on behalf of the state.

This court has no

jurisdiction to hear the within case inasmuch as the plaintiff,
Alan Davis fails to meet the explicit jurisdictional requirements

-

of R.C. §2305.02 and §2743.48.
Moreover,
matter

of

applicable

law

the State of Ohio is entitled to
by

operation

statutes

of

of

the

limitation.

doctrine

of

Additionally,

judgment as a
laches,
a

claim

the
of

wrongful incarceration is a personal claim which an estate has no
standing to pursue. Finally, any claim which may have been lawfully
asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated with his death, the passage
of time, and his failure to pursue the claim at or near the time of
his acquittal.
FACTS
Dr.

Samuel Sheppard was

degree on August 17,

--

1954,

wife, Marilyn Sheppard.

indicted for murder

in the first

in connection with the death of his

(Complaint Paragraph 1). His trial ended
2

-..

with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December
21,

1954,

and

imprisonment.
process,

on

January

(Complaint,

3,

1955

he

was

sentenced

paragraph 2). After a

to

life

lengthy appeals

the United States Supreme Court in 1964,

reversed the

conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the
trial and the prejudicial role of the media. (Complaint, paragraph
3). on November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial
and found not guilty of the murder.

(Complaint paragraph 4). Dr.

Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons.
(Complaint, paragraph 5).
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970. (Complaint, paragraph 6).
The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the

-

Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October,

1995, nearly thirty years

after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

A.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE
Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) provides:
"After the pleadings are closed but within
such time as not to delay trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings."

It is well established in Ohio that after reviewing pleadings,
if a court finds that there exist no material issues of fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the
moving party's motion for

-

judgment on the pleadings should be

granted. Mc Comb v. Suburban Natural Gas Co. (1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d
3

397. Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
restricted solely to allegations in the pleadings, and all material
allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom are to be construed in favor of the non-moving
party. Flanagan v. Williams, (1993) 87 Ohio App. 3d 768. Moreover,
consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is squarely
within the discretion of the court. "Whether the motion constitutes
a delay of trial is within the discretion of the court; however, if
it seems clear that the motion may effectively dispose of the case,
the

court

should

permit

it

regardless

of

any

delay

its

consideration may cause." Fischer v. Morales, 38 Ohio App. 3d 110
(1987).

-

Judgment on the pleadings is the appropriate,

expeditious

outcome for the case at bar. The operative facts as stated are
undisputed. As will be shown below in greater depth, this court is
completely

devoid

of

jurisdiction

to

hear

this

case.

Alternatively, the State of Ohio is materially prejudiced by having
to

defend

Additionally,

a

claim

some

thirty

years

after

it

the legislative history relevant to R.C.

accrued.
§2743.48

together with its specific language demonstrate that the intent of
the

legislature

was

and

continues

to

be

compensation

of

individuals, not their representatives, heirs and assigns.
Finally, the Sheppard estate advances a so-called "new" theory
of the crime as

a

part of

its petition.

Even assuming

those

conclusory theories to be true for the purpose of ruling upon this

-

motion under civil Rule 12 (C), those facts have no relevance to
4

the issue at bar in light of the jurisdictional defect, statutes of
limitation and the doctrines of laches and standing which have been
raised by the State of Ohio.
B.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR ENTER JUDGMENT IN
THE ACTION PENDING

An

action for wrongful

incarceration is purely statutory.

Accordingly, all requisites set forth in R.C.

§2305.02 and R.C.

§2743.48 must be met. The language in R.C. §2305.02 is explicitly
jurisdictional:

2305. 02 Jurisdiction to bear action for wrongful imprisomaent.

-

"A Court of Common Pleas has exclusive, original jurisdiction
to hear and determine an action or proceeding that is
commenced by an individual who satisfies divisions CA) (1) to
(4) of Section 2743.48 of the Revised Code and that seeks a
determination by the court that the offense of which he was
found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either
was not committed by him or was not committed by any person ..
(Emphasis Added)
R.C. §2743.48 sets forth detailed requirements defining who is
a "wrongfully imprisoned individual":

2743.48 Civil Action against state for wrongful imprisonment
(A) As used in this section, a wrongfully imprisoned
individual" means an individual who satisfies each of the
following:
(1) He was charged with a violation of a section of
the Revised Code by an indictment or information
prior to, or on or after, September 24, 1986, and
the violation charged was an aggravated felony or
felony.

-

(2) He was found guilty of, but did not plead
guilty to, the particular charge or a lesserincluded offense by the court
or
jury
involved, and the offense of which he was
found guilty was an aggravated felony or
5

-

felony.
( 3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or
definite term of imprisonment in a state penal
or reformatory institution for the offense of
which he was found guilty.
(4) The individual's conviction was vacated or
was dismissed, or reversed on appeal,
• . .
(5) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or
subsequent to
his
imprisonment,
it was
determined by a court of common pleas that the
offense of which he was found guilty ,
including all lesser included offenses, either
was not committed by him or was not committed
by any person . . .
The plaintiff
jurisdictional
executor

-

of

in this

requirements

the

Sheppard

action
of

the

estate,

fails

to meet

statutes.
is

arguably

the

Alan
an

explicit

Davis,

individual.

However, he is not an individual who satisfies divisions (A)
through

(4)

of R.C.

charged with a

§2743.48.

felony.

the

(1)

Specifically, Alan Davis was not

Alan Davis was not found guilty of the

felony at issue. Alan Davis was not sentenced to imprisonment, nor
did he serve time for the offense at issue. The conviction appealed
was not that of Alan Davis. The statutory scheme was designed to
preclude exactly the type of case at bar. Inasmuch as the plaintiff
herein patently fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements of
the

statute,

the

court

cannot

exercise

jurisdiction over

the

parties and must dismiss the case.

C.

-

THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

This action illustrates precisely the reason that legislatures
6

-

enact statutes which render lawsuits time barred. It is said that
sound public policy justifies a

limitation for commencement of

actions because of the difficulty of preserving evidence,
frailty

of

the

memory,

and

the

contingency

of

the

death

the
of

witnesses. Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose. They are
designed to secure the peace of society and are enacted to prevent
delay in asserting claims. The object and purpose of the statutes
of limitation are to encourage diligence in the enforcement of
demands and the speedy adjudication of the rights of parties. See
generally, 66 O Jur 3d Section 2, p. 129.

-

"Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of
society and are favored in the law. They promote repose
by giving security and stability to human affairs. An
important public policy lies at their foundation. They
stimulate to activity and punish negligence. While time
is constantly destroying the evidence of rights they
supply its place by a presumption which renders proof
unnecessary. Mere delay extending to the limit prescribed
is itself a conclusive bar. The bane and the antidote go
together. "Wood v. carpenter, 101 us 135, 25 Led 807,
quoted in Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 ONP NS 1, 21 O Dec 13.
The bulk of the Wrongful

Imprisonment statute appears

in

Chapter 2743. However, R.C. Section 2305.02 provides that the court
of common Pleas has original jurisdiction over the first stage of
the bifurcated proceeding. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that
wrongful imprisonment actions are civil actions. See State of Ohio
v. Neil

s.

Jackson, 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 1737 (April 20, 1994). See

also, State of Ohio v. Lary Smith, 1989 Ohio App. Lexis 2019 (9th
Appellate

District).

Accordingly,

the

general

statutes

of

limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305 apply to such actions.

-

7

-

R.C. 2305.07
" Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of
the Revised Code, an action upon a contract not in
writing, express or implied, or upon a liability created
by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be
brought within six years after the cause thereof
accrued." (Emphasis added)
R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least
one court has noted. Wright v. State,

69 Ohio App.

3d 775,

591

N.E.2d 1279 (1990).
"For purposes of statutory construction, 'penal statute'
is one which imposes penalty or creates forfeiture, while
'remedial statute' is enacted to correct past defects, to
redress existing wrong, or to promote public good ••. In
this regard 2743. 48 is a remedial statute in that it
addresses an existing wrong. The General Assembly
determined that it was patently wrong to deny a person
compensation when the
judicial system failed
to
adequately safeguard his rights, under the circumstances
set forth in the statute .•. It does not appear the
legislature intended the remedy to penal. .. "
Wright v. State, supra, at 779.

-

The proceeding at bar is a statutory one. Petitioner seeks to
recover damages upon a liability created by statute. Absent the
statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State of Ohio
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit
upon

an

individual's

right

to

incarceration. As a matter of law,
forth in R.C.

seek

recovery

for

wrongful

the six year limitation set

§2305.07 applies. The action can be said to have

accrued, most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective
date of the statute, September 24, 1986. As the petitioner in this
action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the

-

action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07.
8

-

R.c. 2305.09 "Pour Years; certain torts
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought

within four years after the cause thereof accrued;
(A) For trespassing upon real property;
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or
detaining it;
(C)
For relief on the ground of fraud;
(D)
:ror an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising
on contract nor enumerated in sections 2305 .10 to 2305 .12
2305.14 and 1304.34 of the Revised Code • • •
R.C.

§2305.10

applies

to Bodily

injury or

injury to

personal

property; §2305.11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution,
false

imprisonment

commercial
herein,

-

and

malpractice;

transactions.

fall

interpretation

Thus,

any

R.C.
rights

under

section

(D)

of

R.C.

of

accrual

yields

the

§1304. 34
of

the

applies

petitioner,

§2305.09.
date

to

the.

A

liberal
wrongful

incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986. Thus,
assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and
this claim is time barred.

D.

THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF LACHES

In order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches,

the

person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his
rights." Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113,
119 (1959). The elements of laches are: delay or lapse of time in

-

asserting a right, absence of excuse for such delay, knowledge,
9

-..

actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the
other party. Kennedy v. City of Cleveland,

(1984) 16 Ohio App 3d

399, 476 N.E. 2d 683. Delay in asserting a right does not of itself
constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the equitable
doctrine of laches,

it must be shown that the person for whose

benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially prejudiced by
the delay of person asserting his claim. Thirty Four Corp. V. sixty
Seven Corp, (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d. 299. Laches is
an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time under

circumstances prejudicial to the

adverse

party; it signifies delay independent of limitations in statutes,
and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence. cunnin v.

-

Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328 . .
It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time
has occurred between the acquittal of

Samuel Sheppard and the

filing of this claim. In the intervening thirty years since the
acquittal and the near forty-two years since the crime occurred,
events have

transpired which preclude the

State

of

Ohio

from

presenting its complete case; not the least of which is the death
of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated.
(Petition,

paragraph

6).

Claimant's

representatives

conducted

witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably faded.
Moreover, prior to the enactment of R.C.

-

§2743.48 and R.C.

§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of
10

-

moral claims. Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to a
fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual to
fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution.
"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio: Should There be More than A Moral
Obligation to Compensate? 12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230.

"Inherently

defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial.

. •• :the

1923 court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not
being

attributable

to

any

fault

in

the

law;

actually,

the

convictions are due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not
legal ones. These errors are consequences of variables such as a
witness/

-

or

victim's

reactions

to

the

crime,

the

level

of

disturbance in the emotional balance of an individual in response
to both physical and mental stress.

Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until
the true guilty party was ascertained. Thereupon, the legislature
may feel a moral obligation to rectify state infliction of injury
upon an individual. Certain requirements must be met before the
legislature so acted:

-

"First, a cause of action against the state must not
exist for the individual in a court of law ... Second
there must be a moral obligation to make amends. A moral
obligation is one which is not enforceable by action, but
is binding on the party who has the obligation in
conscience and according to natural justice.
The
obligation is viewed as a duty which would be.enforceable
if not for a rule, such as
sovereign immunity, which
exempts the party from legal liability. The extent to
which moral obligations are to be recognized has been
deemed to be a determination properly remaining in the
hands of the legislature.
Finally, there must be no
dispute as to the facts of the particular case.
11

-

"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio: Should there Be More Than A
Moral Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Capital University Law Review
265 (1982).
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process.
He failed to do so.

Since Sheppard's demise in 1970,

only the

administrator of his estate, whose standing is questionable and
will be further examined below, is left to initiate the claim.
The petitioner has set forth no explanation as to why no recourse
has been sought until now. While events which have transpired over
the passage of time have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio,
the

face

of

the

pleadings

reveal

that

Samuel

Sheppard

is

unavailable to testify at his own trial. Accordingly, the State's
motion should be granted.

E.

THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION

The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its
present

form

in

1968

made

justiciability

a

constitutional

requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken
by the Ohio Supreme Court. Fortner v. Thomas (1970) 22 Ohio St. 2d.
13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.).

-

"It has been long and well established that it is the
duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual
controversies between parties legitimately affected by
specific facts and to render judgments which can be
carried into effect. It has become settled judicial
responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions
on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by
judgment of premature declarations or advice upon
12

potential controversies." Fortner v. Thomas, supra, at
13.
Even before the enactment of the constitutional requirement of
justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for
the

consideration

of

anything other than

actual

controversies

between the actual parties litigant. For example,

in Stewart v.

Southard. 17 Ohio 402 (1848), the court held:
"It is our duty to decide such questions only as become
necessary to ascertain the rights of the parties
litigant, and are legitimately presented upon the record,
and we cannot admit that parties have the power to call
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented, which is
out of the case . . . " Stewart , supra, at 406.
The question of jus tertii standing has been examined most fully in
federal

courts.

As

the

Supreme

Court

stated

in

Valley

Forge

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982):
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional
requirements and prudential considerations ..• [A]t an
irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who
invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.'
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 99
(1979), and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the
challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision,' Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976). In this manner
does Article III limit the federal judicial power 'to
those disputes which confine federal courts to a role
consistent with a system of separated powers and which
are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968) 11

-

Thus,

the standing doctrine can be organized into a three13

-

factor

test:

(1)

injury

in

fact;

{2)

causation;

redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112

s.

and

(3)

ct. 2130,

3136 {1992).
In

the

case

at

bar,

factors

one

{injury

in

fact)

and

three

(redressability) are not met. The individual who is alleged to have
been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased. As is discussed above,
there is no provision under law for an estate to seek recovery in
a

representative

capacity.

Moreover,

as

will

greater depth below, the statute at issue, R.C.

be

discussed

in

2743.48 applies

only to individuals, NOT their representatives, heirs and assigns.
Additionally,

there is no allegation in the petition as to any

injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to anyone except the

-

deceased, Samuel Sheppard. Finally, assuming some injury in fact
did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to the estate cannot
redress those injuries.

It is clear that the Estate of Samuel

Sheppard has failed to set forth the constitutionally requisite
case and controversy to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.

F.

R.C. §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS TO
WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS.
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS.

The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented
to be sued in the Court of Claims by virtue of R.C. §2743.02 (A),
which provides, as follows:

-

"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and
consents to be sued, and have its liability determined,
in the court of claims created in this chapter in
accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits
between private parties, subject to the limitations set
14

forth in this chapter."
The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability has not
opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense but,
rather permits the liability of the state to be determined in
accordance with the

rules of

law applicable to

suits

between

private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being
created by the waiver of immunity. R.C. §2743.02 {A) merely permits
actions against the state to be brought which were previously
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such actions must
be predicated upon previously recognized claims for relief,
which

the

state

would

have

been

liable

except

for

for

sovereign

immunity. Smith v. Wait, {1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at 283.
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment. That
action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the
General

Assembly.

R.C.

§2743.48

created

duties,

rights,

and

obligations of a substantive nature. Smith v. Wait, supra.
The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by
the statutory language.
It

is a

language of a
Courts

do

cardinal rule that the court must first
statute

not have

itself to determine

authority to

legislative

look to
intent.

ignore plain and unambiguous

language of statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but
must give effect to words used;

in other words,

courts may not

delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier (Athens

-

1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be
15

taken

in

their

usual,

Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.

normal

or

customary

meaning.

Love

v.

(Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394.

In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in
a statute implies the exclusion of others.

Kirsheman v.

Paulin

(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473.
See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose
the word

11

individual 11 •

An

individual,

as defined by

Websters

Dictionary is:
1. a single human being, as distinguished from a group.
2. a person. 3. a distinct, indivisible entity; a single
11
thing, being, instance or item.
11

The use of the word individual, as opposed to the word person,

--

which has undergone extensive legal interpretation,

expresses a

clear, unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual.
Further

evidence

of

the

legislature's

intent

eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48
subsection (B)

to

limit

can be found in

(1):

When a court of common pleas determines, . . • that a
person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, the court
shall provide the person with a copy of this section and
orally inform him and his attorney of his rights under
this section. . . (Emphasis Added)
11

Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the litigant
himself be present. Moreover, as a matter of public policy it is
logical

that

a

remedy

be

available

to

those

wrongfully

incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families
of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim
·-

fact.
16

after the

Finally,

had

representatives,
individuals

as

the

heirs

legislature
and

compensable

assigns
under

wished
of

the

to

include

wrongfully

statute,

it

the

imprisoned
would

have

included specific language to so indicate, as it did , for example,
in R.C. §2125.02 {Wrongful Death Statute). It is not within the
authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to
areas that very language

G.

was designed to exclude.

AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE DEATH
OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD

Section

2311.21

of

the

Ohio

Revised

Code

provides

for

abatement by death of a party. Specifically, the section states:
"Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding
pending in any court shall abate by the death of either
or both of the parties thereto, except actions for libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or against
a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which
shall abate by the death of either party."

-

Section 2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes
which survive and provides:
"[i]n addition to the causes of action which survive at
common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or
fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled
or liable thereto."
"In order for an action to survive under R.C.

§2305.21,

the

action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means
physical injuries." Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d 46,
47,

-

(1983). At least one court has held" injuries to the person

does not encompass injuries to character or reputation: Flynn v.
17

Relic. 41404 (8th

District. Ohio)

(June 26, 1980).

An action for wrongful imprisonment, thus,

is not an action for

physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.c. §2305.21.
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided" language
in R.C. §2311.21, the action is subject to abatement.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, the
State of Ohio respectfully requests a full hearing on these issues;
that

the

action

be

dismissed

for

lack

of

jurisdiction.

Alternatively, defendant respectfully requests that the court enter

-

judgment on its behalf.
Respectfully Submitted,
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY

ILYN
LEY CASSID80014647)
PATRICK MURPHY (0002401)
Assistant Prosecuting At orneys
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO

-
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CEBTIFICATE OF SEBVICE
A copy of the foregoing Motion has been sent by regular U.S.
mail, postage prepaid, on this

~

day of May, 1997, to Terry

Gilbert, 1700 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, OH
44113.

YN
LEY CASSIDY
Assistant~osecuting
At~orney

-

-
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